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Determinantes dos arranjos contratuais nas
transações de crédito agrícola
Com a redução da oferta do crédito subsidiado no financiamento
da agricultura brasileira, os agentes econômicos ao longo dos
sistemas agroindustriais organizam-se para associar crédito a suas
transações de compra e venda com agricultores. Diferentes arran-
jos contratuais caracterizam-se por distintas estruturas de finan-
ciamento. No presente estudo, objetivou-se verificar a relação
causal entre o tipo de financiamento adotado pelos produtores
de soja no Brasil e seus possíveis determinantes. Dois arranjos
foram escolhidos para análise: obtenção de crédito com bancos e
por meio de transações com agentes da cadeia agroindustrial. As
variáveis explicativas utilizadas foram: tamanho da propriedade,
colateral acessório ao contrato e reputação medida em termos do
tempo de relacionamento. Como previsto na teoria, os resultados
demonstraram que o tamanho da propriedade é um elemento deter-
minante nas transações de crédito entre agricultores e agentes da
cadeia agroindustrial. Entretanto, o relacionamento com banco
público e os colaterais não se mostraram elementos relevantes na
análise dos determinantes da escolha dos arranjos contratuais
para financiamento da soja com agentes do Sistema Agroindustrial
(SAG).
Palavras-chave: contratos, crédito rural, agronegócio.
1. INTRODUCTION
The credit market in general and the agricultural credit in particular, in
Brazil, are characterized by the scarcity reflected in high interest rates as
compared to the current interest rates of other countries. This is due to the
macroeconomic fiscal and monetary policies that have been adopted in this
country in the1980s aiming at the adjustment of public accounts and the need
to restrict the expenses of the public sector (SAYAD, 1978; SPOLADOR, 2001;
BANCO MUNDIAL, 2005)(1).
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The market crisis, which started more abruptly in late 2008,
increased the access to credit on the part of producers. New
strategies have emerged in response to macro environmental
factors. However, it has been observed – between boom and
bust cycles – that the institutional problems make up the
transactions background. In the specific case of agricultural
credit, there is the lack of a fully developed insurance market
able to reduce uncertainties (OSAKI, 2005), and the judicial
system slowdown leads to a legal uncertainty in Brazil (PI-
NHEIRO, 2003).
In response to the rules in force in the Brazilian agricultural
credit market since the late 1980s, trading companies, agri-
cultural input industries, crushing companies, grain exporters
and unions started playing a key role in the coordination of
the agro-industrial systems (Sistemas Agroindustriais – SAGs)
through different contractual arrangements adapted to the
conditions of each region. One of the strategies adopted by
these companies was to associate credit facilities for producers
with the sale of their products or the purchase of commodities
(ALMEIDA, 1994; GONÇALVES et al., 2005). Complex
transaction forms were expanded in the agro-industrial chain
and began to prevail as contractual arrangements, supposedly
as reducers of transaction costs (NEVES, 2003; WATANABE,
2007).
Overall, agricultural credit transactions for financing pro-
duction can be found in two forms: formal credit from financial
institutions or credit from nontraditional credit market agents
(trade credit)(2). In each of these transaction groups, there are
several possible contractual arrangements.
In the first case, the producers are able to contract farm
credit with banks and credit unions. In Brazil, there is a sub-
sidized credit modality for family farming through the National
Family Farming Program (Programa Nacional da Agricultura
Familiar – Pronaf) and there is also the restricted credit with
preferential rates provided to farmers who do not fit into family
farming by the banks associated with the National Farm Credit
System (Sistema Nacional de Crédito Rural – SNCR).
The credit from SAG agents indicates a higher variability
in the contracting forms and will depend on the structure of
the agro-industrial system. In the specific case of soybeans,
producers perform short-term credit operations mainly with
credit unions, input industries, trading companies and crush-
ing and processing industries. In these cases, there are credit
transactions at free rates, as well as the transfer of credit
through credit unions and such union’s transactions with
input industries. The trade credit transaction may generate posi-
tive results for trading companies, as they have access to credit
in the international market and transfer them at higher rates to
producers in Brazil (ALMEIDA, 2008).
The share of non-traditional agents in the flow of financial
resources to producers also appears to be a trend in other
countries. Specifically in the United States, commercial banks
have represented the greatest financial power in the agricultural
market. However, in recent years, the agents of the chain, known
as non-traditional lenders, have been gaining a greater share
in the flow of financial resources for agriculture (CHADDAD
and LAZZARINI, 2003).
In agricultural credit transactions, the credit cannot be
understood as a single transaction in the flow of information
and resources throughout the agro-industrial system. There is
a set of characteristics indicating that contractual arrangements
for farm loans fall within the group of hybrid contracts or even
complex contracts. As pointed out by Ménard (2004), there are
bonds connecting the agents in hybrid relationships, that is,
there is a certain degree of dependence. In the contractual
relationships of SAG, credit agents are interconnected with
producers, either by the specificity of existing assets in the
production process of the negotiated product, by the frequency
of transactions, or even by the environment uncertainty. 
Also according to Ménard (2004), uncertainties can be de-
rived from the inputs to the transaction (ex ante), from final
products (ex post) or even from environmental factors. In credit
transactions, the uncertainty arises from the informational
asymmetry (ex ante opportunism) and the moral risk (ex post
opportunism), in addition to issues directly involving agricul-
tural production, that is, the risk of irregularities that could
jeopardize the crop and prevent the borrower to honor his debts.
It can be concluded that in the agricultural credit market,
the options to finance production are many and complex.
However, each one of them contains features that will affect
the farmers’ decisions regarding the most appropriate arrange-
ment to finance their crops.
The key question of this study is: What are the deter-
minants of the contractual arrangements for financing the
agricultural production in Brazil that differentiate traditional
agents from trade credit agents? In other words, this study
aims to evidence determinants and differentiating elements
regarding the type of financing to fund the crop. 
To answer this question, we opted for a multiple regression
model that tests the existence of a relationship between the
credit volume obtained either by traditional agents, or trade
credit agents, and potentially determining factors: farm size,
association of collateral with the credit agreement and the
reputational aspect measured by the relationship of rural pro-
ducers with financial agents. These relationships allow testing
the hypotheses formulated in the light of the theoretical
contribution regarding the reduction of transaction costs and
the literature on capital structure determinants. The data was
collected from 115 soybean producers from the main producing
regions of Brazil.
The decision-making to finance every new crop reflects
the incentives to which creditors and borrowers are submitted.
For many years, the institutional environment appeared to be
limited for the development of a complete agricultural credit
market in Brazil. Ultimately, this study aims to contribute to the
discussion of practices that encourage the reduction of trans-
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action costs, improving credit markets in order to reduce the
spreads charged, by enhancing the allocation and provision
of rates appropriate to the reality of agricultural markets.
This article is divided into six sections, including this in-
troduction. In the next section, we present the theoretical ref-
erence that focuses on the works of Titmam and Wessels (1988),
Williamson (1988), Balakrishnan and Fox (1993) and Petersen
and Rajan (1997). In this set of studies, we identified the hypoth-
esis concerning the determinants of contractual arrangements
to finance production. The third section presents the data
collection methods and statistical tools used in this research.
The fourth and fifth sections presents the results derived from
the tests of hypotheses and, lastly, the conclusions will close
this article.
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Agricultural credit instruments and the contractual arrange-
ment instruments differ from each other depending on the
creditor, which may be traditional credit agents – such as banks
and credit unions – and credit agents from non-traditional
sources, herein called trade credit – such as trading compa-
nies, production cooperatives and industrial inputs.
Banks and credit unions – agents specialized in credit exten-
sions – offer credit for financing, fulfilling their role as pure
financial agents. In this transaction, in addition to bank credit,
there is a contractual form based on funds controlled by the
government with preferential rates. The offer of subsidized
credit is limited as it comes from the Nation’s budget through
the equalization system(3). It is natural that there may be alloca-
tion mechanisms based on politically defined criteria. By having
transaction costs and shortage in the official credit supply of
lower cost, it seems natural that the phenomenon of queues
(BARZEL, 1982) happen as a way to allocate the scarce
resource. In addition, there is a limit on the volume granted to
each borrower, who must meet specific criteria based on the
scale of operations and the agricultural activity modality. In
summary, the fully subsidized credit is directed to family farm-
ing through Pronaf. Therefore, producers in the agribusiness
– focus of this research – end up having to compose their financ-
ing needs with alternative ways, presenting market rates
ranging from 11% to 30% per annum.
Trade credit agents, in turn, associate credit with their
marketing strategies, such as input industries, and their origin-
ation strategies, which is the case of trading and processing
companies. The strategy of associating the products flow with
the financial flow is interesting for trade credit agents as it
increases the chances of access to the producing market in
the case of buyers, and increases the sales volume in the case
of sellers. Moreover, the frequency with which the transactions
occur allows companies to obtain information on the payment
ability of their customers, to which banks do not have access
(PETERSEN and RAJAN, 1997).
Processors and traders in the agro-industrial chain use
advance contracts in the form of inputs and financial resources.
Such transactions are backed by formalized contracts, such as
rural producer notes (Cédulas do Produtor Rural – CPR), green
soybean contracts or even by informal CPRs, also called off-
-the-record agreements, since they are not registered (SPOLA-
DOR, 2001). Such contractual arrangements are characteri-
zed by high interest rates compared to restricted credit, which
are based on the compensation of public bonds (Selic rate)
plus other costs (GONÇALVES et al., 2005).
Since the 1970s, the significant presence of economic a-
gents replacing the role of financial institutions became com-
mon in agribusiness as a way to strengthen the relationship
with their customers, increase sales and ensure the sustain-
ability of their business in the long term.
According to Petersen and Rajan (1997), in the trade credit
transactions, the creditors of the companies would have privi-
leged access to the borrowers’ information in contrast to fi-
nancial institutions, given that the sellers or buyers of these
companies frequently visit borrowers, or have greater know-
ledge on the business conditions due to their applications.
There is also the privileged condition of control over the
borrower, given the business relationship with the seller or
buyer agent. Thus, the companies would also offer credits to
firms with current financial problems but that indicate growth
rates, because they believe that by investing in the relationship
with these firms, in the future, such supplier would benefit
from the upcoming profits. In other words, the loan to any
type of borrower guarantees the permanence of the creditor in
the market. Therefore, in conditions of high competition, the
trade credit strategy would be compensatory.
The authors also claim that firms use trade credit when
they cannot be eligible for the credit offered by banking insti-
tutions. In this case, creditors may attract high-risk customers,
but they will also be able to implement a higher (spread) price
in their operations (PETERSEN and RAJAN, 1997).
The situations mentioned by the authors can be observed
in the relationships between agricultural producers and retailers
of agricultural inputs, trading companies and processing com-
panies, as there is an interdependence relationship between
the various links of the agro-industrial system. Both buyers
and sellers are interested in offering credit to rural producers,
which is part of the competitive strategy, providing the basis
for the sustainability of the agricultural activity and, therefore,
for their own business. In both cases, agents that have rela-
tionships with the producers are the key elements in informa-
tional terms, since they visit the farms and establish a close and
intense contact with the producer. Every time the supply has a
strategic role for the trading company or for the agro-industry,
more complex extra-market mechanisms become relevant.
The access to credit is determined by factors related to the
firm size and its ability to offer tangible collaterals to its creditors
(TITMAN and WESSELS, 1988; JIMENEZ and SAURINA,
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2003). Moreover, other aspects may determine the relationship
between creditors and borrowers, such as the information
(STIGLITZ and WEISS, 1981; BARRY, STEVEN and LAJILI,
1992) available to the creditor concerning the rural produc-
er. This information may include its debt level, as well as
the frequency with which transactions are carried out, as
they become relational contracts supported by the future va-
lue of continuous transactions between the agents (BAKER,
GIBBONS and MURPHY, 2002). This set of information is
relevant for the risk analysis in the absence of a public registra-
tion system that includes the registration of collaterals and
other information about the borrower.
Based on the studies on the financing structure determin-
ants of a firm, the following hypotheses are presented to explain
the relationship between farmers and creditors. Three aspects
were chosen for the establishment of causal relationships: firm
size, use of collaterals and length of the relationship between
borrowers and creditors.
2.1. Firm size
Titman and Wessels (1988) found that the leverage of a
firm is positively related to its size. In other words, the higher
the variables indicating the scales, the greater the interest of
creditors in offering credit to these firms. Moreover, small
enterprises face higher transaction costs to make use of long-
-term financial instruments and, therefore, the leverage becomes
unfavorable to these borrowers.
Taking the agricultural credit scenario in Brazil, there is a
scarcity of resources given the high demand on the part of the
producers. Regarding the mandatory percentage allocation of
on-demand deposits for the farm credit activity, as occurs in
Brazil, it is expected for financial agents to only limit the supply
for those with better payment conditions, either by having a
larger scale, which leads to a smaller number of contracts, or
by the increased capacity to ensure payment through collater-
als in case of default. Thus, small farmers have less access to
these funds. Whereas banks (traditional agents) are the key
factors for the allocation of controlled resource and by con-
sidering the phenomenon of queues, it is possible to conclude
that these institutions will assign it to customers with greater
payment capacity and lower operating costs, that is, to medium
and large landowners.
Regarding the performance of traditional credit agents, Néri
and Giovanini (2005) state that these agents concern about
ensuring loans to large enterprises, due to their ability to better
contribute to the profitability of banks, rejecting low volume
transactions, given the fixed costs of administrative and infor-
mational nature involved in the process.
Hypothesis 1 – Thus, it can be concluded that leverage
through traditional agents is positively relat-
ed to farm size.
Petersen and Rajan (1997) investigated trade credit transac-
tions to assess their determinants. Among the findings, the
authors concluded that the trade credit increases due to the com-
pany size and this occurs because the size can be an indication
for the continuity of trade relations and also of the existence of
higher value allocated as collateral. The results showed that
the trade credit practice with these companies demonstrates
the interdependence between buyers and sellers. Thus, selling
to buyers of large volumes indicates the survival of the business.
In view of these findings, it can be concluded that the size
of rural enterprises is positively related to the leverage through
trade credit, since the greater the potential transaction volume
and the larger the farms sizes, the greater the interest of private
agents credit to associate credit with their business transac-
tions. In other words, the causes of down-to-scale gains may
be: to save on transaction costs, because each transaction
has a bureaucratic cost, and the existence of higher collaterals.
Hypothesis 4 – Thus, it can be concluded that the leverage
through trade credit is positively related to
farm size.
2.2. Collaterals
Regarding the reduction of transaction costs (Economia
dos Custos de Transação – ECT), Williamson (1988) presented
his contribution to questions concerning the capital structure
formation, associating it with the governance concept. The
author assures that the financial leverage decisions of a firm
are more related to strategic and control aspects than exclusive-
ly to financial factors. Thus, Williamson (1988) introduces the
concept of dequity and establishes causal relationships
between the decision to use the equity or to perform a financial
leverage through the use of redeployable assets by the firm.
In general, the author certifies that this choice will rely on
the asset’s redemployment degree or on the second-use value
of such asset in an activity other than the one to which the
asset was built. Thus, the leverage of a firm is negatively related
to the use of assets with increasing degrees of specificity,
which are also used as collaterals for credit transactions. The
greater the asset redeployability, the higher the probability of
loans, on which these assets will be taken as collaterals. On
the other hand, for those firms with higher degree of asset
specificity, there will be a greater probability of using their
own resources instead of third-party resources.
Based on the concepts developed by Williamson (1988),
Balakrishnan and Fox (1993), empirical tests were conducted,
which results indicated that the leverage of a firm is positively
related to the potential redeployability of their existing assets.
This implies that, in case of bankruptcy or execution of
collateral, creditors will have greater difficulty with the specific
assets that will lose their value as compared to non-specific
assets easily sold to market agents.
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In the agricultural credit market, there can be observed a
practice implemented by creditors through which they take
the future crop of producers as collateral, in addition to other
collaterals, such as mortgages, guarantors and pledge. How-
ever, depending on the type of creditor, such collaterals will
have greater or lesser degree of redeployability. In the case of
banks and credit unions, traditional credit agents, it is expected
for their greatest interest to be the acquirement of collaterals,
such as mortgages and pledges, since the financial institution
has the experience and structure to accomplish the liquidation
of assets. Differently, the sale of the future crop requires speci-
fic skills and relationships, which in general, do not fall under
the financial institutions competences.
Hypothesis 2 – Thus, it can be concluded that the use of the
future crop as a collateral for credit transac-
tions is negatively related to leverage by
means of the traditional agents. 
The agents in the agro-industrial system – such as trading
companies, unions and input industries – incur in coordinate
relationships, which facilitates the acceptance of the crop as
collateral, in addition to collaterals, such as mortgages and
guarantors. Petersen and Rajan (1997) concluded that the higher
the possibility of using the products traded by the creditor
(redeployment), the greater the credit supply. The possibility
to redeem sold or purchased goods that could be reused in
other transactions appears as an advantage on financial in-
stitutions. That is, it is expected for credit to primarily flow into
markets where there is product liquidity, as is the case of com-
modities, which markets, spot and futures, are structured. 
Hypothesis 5 – Thus, it can be concluded that the use of the
future crop as a collateral for credit transac-
tions is positively related to the leverage through
trade credit.
2.3. Reputation
The reputational aspect assumes a crucial role in the
preparation of institutional arrangements (BAKER, GIBBONS
and MURPHY, 2002). In trade and credit relations between
private agents and farmers, it is no different. However, given
the difficulty of access to accurate information regarding the
payment capacity of borrowers, private agents use strategies
to minimize risk such as analyzing the relationship between
the borrower and traditional agents.
Petersen and Rajan (1997) affirm that the trade credit may
increase depending on the borrower’s relationship with
financial institutions. The premise behind this action indicates
that the longer the relationship, the greater the probability for
the borrower to be a good payer, given the strict selection of
traditional creditors. In the case of agricultural credit market,
producers primarily access the restricted credit through banks.
The banks, in turn, either by risk management or by the limited
credit availability at preferential rates, apply selection sys-
tems. For trade credit agents, this selection becomes a guarantee
for their relationship with the farmer. Therefore, it can be
concluded that, if such farmer acquired access to restricted
credit, there will be more chances this farmer is a good payer
as compared to those who have failed the selection procedure
of banks.
The literature on trade credit states that, in the absence of
reliable information concerning the borrower, the agents take
as a presumption in favor of the borrower, the fact such
borrower maintains a relationship with a bank, as this traditional
agent tends to investigate the payment capacity of the borrow-
er. Thus, for trade credit agents, if the borrower obtains credit
in the bank, it means that its risk profile is lower than the one
who does not take a bank loan (PETERSEN and RAJAN, 1997).
Hypothesis 3 – Thus, it can be concluded that the leverage
through traditional agents is positively related
to the history of transactions between farmers
and banks. 
As a proxy for reputation, the frequency of transactions
between creditors and borrowers is used. Baker, Gibbons and
Murphy (2002) consider this repetition as part of the so-called
relational contract, which is based on observable, but not con-
tractible, behaviors. For transactions between producers and
traditional agents, the reputation – measured by the length of
the relationship between borrowers and creditors – emerges
as a key element, so that transactions can continually endure.
Thus, it is expected for relationships with a long history of
transactions between banks and farmers to be positively related
to the leverage with these institutions.
Hypothesis 6 – Thus, it can be concluded that the leverage
through trade credit is positively related to
the length of relationship between farmers and
traditional agents.
3. METHODS AND STATISTICAL TREATMENT
The research conducted to answer the objectives proposed
was based on a questionnaire applied to soybean producers
located in the producing states in Brazil. The sample used was
induced and non-random, due to the impossibility of access
to a database with information regarding the universe of rural
producers in Brazil, which according to the Brazilian Institute
of Geography and Statistics (Instituto Brasileiro de Geogra-
fia e Estatística – IBGE, 2007), totals 5,2 million. It was based
on a database with 4,600 farmers, arising from several sources,
including private companies of the productive chain of soybean
and government statistical agencies. Randomly, 500 farmers
214 R.Adm., São Paulo, v.45, n.3, p.209-220, jul./ago/set. 2010
Luciana Florêncio de Almeida, Decio Zylbersztajn and Peter G. Klein
were chosen for the research and out of this total, 115 farmers(4)
volunteered to answer the questionnaire by telephone, out of
these, 107 cases were considered valid, which generated a
response rate of 22%.
The sample stratification was based on the participation of
every state in the national production, as shown in Chart 1.
We observed a relatively homogeneous distribution be-
tween farm sizes, with the large areas representing a greater
share (34%), which indicate between 500 to 2,000 hectares,
reflecting the reality of soybean production in the country. The
largest farms, with 5,700 hectares on average, are located in
Mato Grosso, and the smallest ones are located in Rio Grande
do Sul, with 570 hectares on average.
By phone, structured questionnaires were applied during
September and October 2005. Two statistical treatments were
used to analyze the information: descriptive statistics analysis,
exploring the tools of frequency, histograms and averages;
econometric model based on multiple-regression equations to
analyze the relationships on the determinants of the financing
with third parties.
To facilitate the implementation of econometric tests, we
chose to group the hypotheses in the following models:
• Model A – dependent variable is the financing volume with
traditional agents.
• Model B – dependent variable is the financing volume with
trade credit agents.
A third model was generated (Model AB) as a control group,
whose dependent variable is the total financing volume with
third parties, that is, the sum of the financing volumes with
traditional agents and trade credit agents.
The equation adopted for Model A was:
γ = bo + b1V1 + b2V2 + b3V3 + e [1]
where:
γ = credit volume (expressed in monetary values – Real)
obtained from financial institutions;
bo = constant;
V1 = farm size (hectares);
V2 = future crop(5) as collateral (dummy variable);
V3 = length of relationship between the farmer and the official
and private bank (in years).
The hypotheses of Model A are: 
H1: V1>0 – The leverage through traditional agents is pos-
itively related to the farm size.
H2: V2<0 – The use of future crop as a collateral for credit
transactions is negatively related to the leverage
through traditional agents.
H3: V3>0 – The leverage through traditional agents is pos-
itively related to the history of transactions be-
tween farmers and traditional agents.
The equation adopted for Model B was:
γ = bo + b4V4 + b5V5 + b6V6 + b7V7 + e [2]
where:
γ = credit volume (expressed in monetary values – Real)
obtained from trade credit agents(6);
bo = constant;
Chart 1: Source of Questionnaires as per Brazilian State
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V4 = farm size (hectares);
V5 = future crop as collateral (dummy variable);
V7 = length of relationship between the farmer and the official
bank (in years).
The hypotheses of Model B are: 
H4: V4>0 – The leverage through traditional agents is pos-
itively related to the farm size.
H5: V5>0 – The use of future crop as a collateral is positively
related to the leverage through the trade credit.
H6: V6>0 – The leverage through trade credit is positively
related to the history of transactions between
farmers and banks.
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics concerning the varia-
bles. There was no significant correlation between the variables
tested. However, the heteroscedasticity phenomenon was
found in the variables of the models. Thus, the results were
corrected by using White’s Test.
4. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
In this section, the survey analyses are presented in two
parts: the first one presents descriptive statistics on the financ-
ing structure of soybean producers, the second presents the
statistical tests of the hypotheses concerning the capital
structure determinants of soybean producers.
4.1. Production description and financing structure of
soybean producers
Overall, in the sample, the leverage of funds to finance the
needs of short-term capital for 2004/2005 crop primarily comes
from the set of trade credit sources (47%), followed by the
producers’ resources (35%) and, lastly, from SNCR’s controlled
resources (18%), as shown in Chart 2. It was found that, out of
the 107 respondents, 94% underwent operations with restricted
resources; 64%, with trade credit associated with the restricted
resources; 73% with producers resources associated with some
type of financing. Only two producers financed crop costs
exclusively with their own funds, both of them were large
producers.
The survey indicated dispersion between the actual
amounts spent by soybean producers in 2004/2005 crop. This
dispersion is due to the occurrence of a few very large produc-
ers. By observing the histogram regarding amounts under R$
10 million, it can be seen that the concentration of expenses
occurs at amounts under R$ 200.000,00, which relates to farm
sizes in the sample, since 73% of respondents have properties
under 2,000 hectares. Larger farms require high investment
volumes, which was demonstrated in the study, with amounts
reaching up to R$ 50 million.
By verifying the percentage of such expenses financed by
restricted funds, the dispersion decreases. It can be seen that
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics of Variables
    Variables Mean Standard Deviation Number of Observations
Area 1,699.40 hectares 4,227.72 hectares 107
Amount with Banks R$ 355.155,66 R$ 471.011,28 101
Total Trade Credit Amount R$ 911.370,33 R$ 3.112.846,89 171
Total Amount – Third Parties R$ 1.263.206,80 R$ 3.213.381,50 105
Official Bank – Years 20 years 11 years 107
Private Bank - Years 3 years 7 years 107
Chart 2: Financing Structure of 2004/2005 Crop
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most producers will fund up to 60% of their crop with rural
notes.
Focusing the analysis on collaterals of farm credit agree-
ments, there are basically five types: rural property mortgage;
urban real estate mortgages; future crop; guarantors and pledge
(farm machinery and tools). Every soybean producer that was
interviewed was required to provide some type of collateral to
enter into the restricted credit agreement with the financial
institutions and the results suggest that, for some cases, more
than one collateral has been required. It can be seen that 74%
of borrowers offered the future crop, 35% were required to
present a guarantor, 30% mortgaged some kind of rural property,
and lastly, 7% offered machinery and/or tools as pledge.
4.2. Statistical test of the contractual arrangement
determinants
This section presents the results of the statistical tests for
the hypotheses on the financing structure determinants of
agricultural production focusing on farm size, collaterals and
reputation. The Table 2 summarizes the tests previously carried
out with standard errors consistent with heteroscedasticity.
Model A aimed to analyze the leverage determinants with
traditional agents, considering size, collateral and relationship
as the variables: In this model, we have used two variables to
represent the relationship between financial institutions and
farmers: length of the relationship with the public bank and
length of the relationship with the private bank. For the
collateral, we used the future crop variable. The coefficient of
determination appeared to have a low explanatory ratio (R2 =
0.209), which indicates that the model has a predictive power
of 21% over the causal relationship as compared to the analysis
of the mean. However, the F ratio of Model B appeared to be
above the sum of squared errors, indicating that, given the
sample used for estimation, the model can explain 6% more
than the observation of the mean.
In one of the complementary tests for Model A, only the
variable length of relationship with public bank was used to
represent the relationship, and in this case, the determination
coefficient dropped to 0.0698, indicating that the share of other
variables has contributed to the predictive power of the model.
In another test, variables such as rural mortgage and urban
mortgage were included to represent the collateral variable. It
is worth to point out that they are all dummy variables and not
Table 2
Estimates of Regression Parameters
          Dependent Variable Traditional Agents Trade Credit Third Parties
Financial (A) Financial (B) Financing (A + B)
Independent Variable Expected Expected
Signal Signal
Size + 24.640 + 707.890* 734.715*
 (24.98117)  (54.88071)  (30.31578)
Collateral −
58,644.62 + -70,280.53 2,527.31
 (101,323.2)  (109,317.3)  (102,721.3)
Relationship + 24,829.87
#** + 1,409.44
@ 2,006.58@
 (11,538.97) (5,747.303)  (5,941.248)
Model A B AB
Constant 137,274.0 -268,475.8 -5,218.463
 (101,421.5) (120,898.5)  (116,632.0)
R2 0.209 0.921 0.938
F Ratio 6.0398 361.58 468.37
Number of Observations *** 96 96 96
Notes: . The table reports the coefficients and standard deviation (in parentheses).
* Significant at 1%.
** Significant at 10%.
# The result refers to the variable “length of the relationship with the private bank”.
@ The result refers to the variable “length of the relationship with the public bank”.
*** The number of observations was reduced due to the number of observations of the variable crop.
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mutually dependent. In other words, the respondent could
choose all of them or at least one. In this case, the coefficient
of determination reached 0.225, indicating that additional
variables help explain the relationship, although the predictive
power is low (F = 4.114; sig. = 0.001). 
Model B examined the correlation between the leverage
with trade credit agents and variables such as size, relationship
(length of the relationship with the official bank) and collat-
eral. The model appeared with the determination coefficient of
R2 = 0.9218, indicating a high explanatory power. 
Two variables were added to the model regarding other
collaterals used as guarantees in agriculture credit contracts:
rural mortgage and urban mortgage. The model remained
predictive with the addition of these variables and the F ratio
was higher than the sum of the squares (R2 = 0.925; F = 175.476). 
Model A+B sought to analyze the effect of variables in the
decision of the producer’s total funding, which jointly reflected
the leverage with traditional agents and trade credit agents.
Model A+B proved to be as predictive as Model B. Area, crop
and length of relationship with the bank official were used as
variables.
5. RESULTS
Model A indicated reduced eloquence based on F measures
and the significance of explanatory variables. However, the
variable length of relationship with private banks seemed to
be relevant to explain the financing with traditional agents as
provided for in hypothesis 3. The variable relationship with
the official bank, however, has not indicated the same
behavior. Given that the official banks are the largest providers
of restricted credit and that, in several regions, the only option
for farmers to access this credit, they tend to attract the best
customers and, therefore, there would be an adverse selection
in private banks. In this situation, the length of relationship
becomes an important variable in the analysis of the borrower’s
reputation by private banks. Thus, the higher the relationship,
the higher the probability for the farmer to renew the credit
agreement with the private bank (relational contract).
On the other hand, models B and AB appeared to be
appropriate for explaining the causal relationship between the
variables. In model B, the farm size variable appears to be
relevant when explaining the financing with trade credit agents
and supports hypothesis 4. The same effect occurs for the
Model AB. The other variables – length of relationship with
the public bank and crop – are not statistically significant to
explain the financing with trade credit agents.
Table 3 summarizes the signals obtained for each hypoth-
esis. The signal consistency was observed in size and relation-
ship variables (positively) for models A and B. Meanwhile, the
signals from the collateral variable, both for financing with
trade credit and with traditional agents, were not consistent
with the results expected by hypotheses 2 and 5. 
The next section presents the final discussions on the re-
sults and objectives proposed by this research.
6. CONCLUSIONS
This study aimed to verify the existence of determinants of
the financing structure regarding the production and existing
contractual arrangements. The arrangements were organized
into two groups: traditional agents (public banks and private
banks) and trade credit agents (non-traditional agents, private
companies in the SAG).
Table 3
Results Analysis
Hypotheses Expected Signal
Signal Obtained
Model A
H1: The leverage through traditional agents is positively related to the farm size. + +
H2: The use of the future crop as a collateral for credit transactions is negatively related to the leverage
through traditional agents. − +
H3: The leverage through traditional agents is positively related to the history of transactions between farmers
and traditional agents. + +
Model B
H4: The leverage through trade credit is positively related to the farm size. + +
H5: The use of future crop as a collateral is positively related to the leverage through trade credit. + −
H6: The leverage through trade credit is positively related to the history of transactions between farmers and banks. + +
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Overall, the forms of financing via trade credit are deter-
mined as alternative arrangements to the scarcity of restricted
credit to producers and as supply and marketing strategies for
companies in the SAG. On the other hand, it is observed that
the credit obtained from financial institutions continues to be
an important source for financing agricultural production.
The hypotheses of this study were formulated in the light
of the theory on the economy of transaction costs and studies
on determinants of the capital structure. Farm size, length of
relationship with traditional creditors, participation in the se-
curitization program and the use of future crop as contractual
collateral were analyzed as determinants.
The results showed that the ability of soybean producers
to finance their agricultural production with trade credit agents
is directly related to the size of their productive operation.
However, the reputation with the financial agents and the future
crop granted as collateral are not relevant to explain this
relationship.
Regarding the confirmation of the hypothesis on the impor-
tance of firm size for trade credit agents, the results support the
works of Petersen and Rajan (1996). The results indicated that
this option is held to a greater degree by producers with higher
production volume, confirming the authors’ precept stating that
the trade credit increases according to the company size.
It was not possible to affirm that there was a positive
correlation between funding from traditional agents and farm
size, as previously expected. The scarcity of funds, preferential
rates and increased indebtedness of farmers with past debts,
which led to the securitization process in the 1990s, led banks
to conduct rigorous selection procedures. Thus, other varia-
bles such as credit score and the financing amount on the
assets should have a greater impact on the creditors’ deci-
sions. Given that banks use models to estimate the borrower’s
risk, the set of variables tested here, when associated with
others, may better characterize the borrower and, hence, de-
termine the contractual arrangement. On the other hand, trade
credit agents that have no competence to conduct more
rigorous selection procedures are based on observable vari-
ables such as size.
As for the reputational aspects, it was found that the length
of the relationship with financial institutions was not a relevant
variable to explain both arrangements. Only the variable length
of relationship with private banks seemed to be relevant to
explain the arrangement with banks. This can be explained by
the necessity of private banks to base upon relational contracts
(frequency and reputation) in order to reduce adverse selection,
since official banks have more favorable conditions to attract
the best customers.
While the reputational aspect did not appear to be relevant
in the models, one can reckon that it may be measured in
different ways other than just the length of the relationship
with banks. With respect to trade credit agents, the reputation
can be measured by the proximity with the borrower, which
allows monitoring the business profitability. On the other hand,
banks must use other information accessed through social
networking, such as timely payments of suppliers in relation-
ships brokered by the bank. Alternatively, the reputation
exclusively refers to the borrower’s credit score and the aspects
regarding the borrower’s behavior with other creditors are
irrelevant.
The propositions of Balakrishnann and Fox (1993) and
Williamson (1988), regarding the relationship between redeploy-
able assets and the leverage by third parties, were not cor-
roborated. Both banks and trade credit agents require the future
crop as collateral in credit agreements. It can be noted in the
sample that 74% of borrowers offered the future crop. This
result may indicate the increasing interrelationship between
financial institutions and trade credit agents, on which by ac-
cepting the crop, financial institutions can sell them to these
companies, forming triangular trade relationships. These
operations have been leaded by the intensive use of CPRs,
which associate the anticipation of funds with the future crop
delivery. In addition, since they are located in agricultural
regions, these financial agents specialize in the agricultural
credit supply, creating social and business networks that enable
them establishing transactions shared with agents of the agro-
-industrial chain. As provided in the theory on hybrid forms
(MÉNARD, 2004), credit agreements show the interdependence
between the agents as a way to reduce the uncertainties and
transaction costs.
Considering the 2008/2009 crisis scenario in the global
markets, the Brazilian agribusiness has been mainly affected
concerning the access to credit, further aggravating the situa-
tion of the aforementioned producers, as shown in this study,
and institutional elements related to the transaction that narrow
the access to credit at appropriate rates as per the agricultural
production financing.
The results indicate the complex relationships that deter-
mine the financing, depending on the creditor. In the absence
of a fully developed insurance market for both credit and crop,
and given the results obtained in this research, we suggest
the government authorities and creditors to enter into an alli-
ance in order to reduce the adverse effects of credit scarcity
and of high interest rates on the sustainability of agribusiness.
Initiatives, such as the sharing of risk between traditional and
nontraditional agents, the development of a positive reference
file for borrowers and the performance of transactions backed
by agribusiness receivables are welcomed by the market and
should be stimulated by the government, as a way to reduce
transaction and mitigation costs of uncertainties and risks
associated with the agricultural activity.
By looking at the current and future contractual relation-
ships in the agro-industrial chain in Brazil and the importance
of credit to support them, the results of this study lead to a
research agenda with three central vertices: the overall study
on the credit market regulation and specifically the agricultural
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market, considering the drop of interest rates; the impacts of
trade credit as an important business strategy based on rela-
tional aspects; studies on crop insurance, since it is an im-
portant instrument to reduce uncertainties and may provide
a new institutional path to the agricultural credit scenario in
Brazil.
(1) According to Sayad (1978) the agricultural credit
policy has exhausted its possibilities in the late 1970s.
The author outlines three central issues: the unequal
distribution of subsidized credit among the produc-
ers categories, for only 20% of the total have access
to the funding and most of them are large landown-
ers; the credit increase not followed by the produc-
tion increase; the operation of the rural credit system
had an impact on the monetary policy, thus, gener-
ating inflation.
(2) Trade credit in Portuguese means, credit transaction.
According to Ferris (1981), it is a mechanism that
separates the exchange of money for the actual
uncertainty in the exchange of goods. In other words,
it indicates the purchase of goods or services with
deferred payment to the supplier or the sale of goods
or services with collection adjournment or antici-
pation.
(3) The rate at the time of the study was 8.75% per
annum. In 2008, such rate went down to 6.75% per
annum. The Selic rate for December/2008 was 13%
per annum. The equalization system of interest rates
is equivalent to the payment of the difference be-
tween the interest rates charged by the financial
market and those paid by farmers. This equivalence
is made by the National Treasury. In the Brazilian
farm-credit market, the interest rate applied in the
official farm credit is lower than the one in force in
the market, and according to Barzel (1982), it is rea-
sonable to expect that mechanisms emerge to allo-
cate the excess demand. Such a mechanism, repre-
sented by the phenomenon of queues, can be seen
as being formed by access costs, which in practice
could be priced indicating higher real interest rates.
(4) In this sample, we did not include family farmers
who have access to other forms of agricultural credit,
not addressed in this research. 
(5) Future crop corresponds to the crop to be harvested
after contracting the credit to finance production.
(6) This amount represents the sum related to the agree-
ments with CPR carried out with private agents, agree-
ments of advance procurement of inputs and ad-
vance financing agreements.
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Determinants of contractual arrangements in agricultural credit transactions
Because of a reduction in the supply of subsidized agricultural credit in Brazil, the economic agents in the agro-
-industrial systems organized themselves to tie in credit and their buying and selling transactions with farmers. Different
types of agreements appeared, characterized by different finance structures. In this study, the authors aimed at
verifying the causal relation between the type of financing used by soy producers in Brazil and their possible determinants.
Two arrangements were chosen for analysis: getting bank loans and getting loans tied to transactions with agro-
-industrial chain agents. The explanatory variables used were property size, guarantees provided and reputation,
measured in terms of how long the relationship had existed for. As foreseen in the theory, results showed that property
size is one of the determinants of credit transactions between farmers and agro-industrial chain agents. However, the
relation with government banks and the guarantees did not turn out to be relevant elements for the analysis of the
determinants in the choice of contractual arrangements for soy financing with agents of the agro-industrial system.
Keywords: contracts, rural credit, agribusiness.
Determinantes de los arreglos contractuales en las operaciones de crédito agrícola
Con la reducción de la oferta de créditos subsidiados en el financiamiento de la agricultura brasileña, los agentes
económicos en los sistemas agroindustriales se organizan para vincular crédito a sus operaciones de compra y venta
con agricultores. Distintos arreglos contractuales se caracterizan por diferentes estructuras de financiamiento. El
objetivo de este estudio fue verificar la relación causal entre el tipo de financiamiento utilizado por los productores de
soja en Brasil y sus posibles factores determinantes. Dos arreglos fueron elegidos para análisis: la obtención de crédito
con los bancos y por medio de las transacciones con agentes de la cadena agroindustrial. Las variables explicativas
utilizadas fueron: tamaño de la propiedad, colateral o garantía del contrato y reputación medida en términos de duración
de la relación. Como se afirma en la teoría, los resultados demostraron que el tamaño de la propiedad es un factor
determinante en las operaciones de crédito entre agricultores y agentes de la cadena agroindustrial. Sin embargo, la
relación con el banco público y los colaterales no se mostraron relevantes en el análisis de los factores determinantes
de los arreglos contractuales para financiamiento de la soja con agentes del sistema agroindustrial.
Palabras clave: contratos, crédito rural, agroindustria.
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